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Some years ago
I was with a consultancy team in Burkina Faso
preparing our first interviews in the field with local
foresters and villagers. We were having passionate debates.
"Is law important for environmental management?"
"Konsense!", my colleagues' statement was categorical.
"Look" hè said, pointing at the dry Sahelian scenery around
us, where women were tilling the fields with a hoe and
some drooping trees kept up appearances of a forest, "the
soil is poor, the forests are poor, the rains are poor, the
people are poor and they have poor tools. What they need
to better manage their land and trees is technical
innovations and economie incentives, and not laws."
With my legal background I feit challenged and starled to
défend arguments that laws, raies and institutions actually
are important for the local management of natural
resources. I was not very successful in convincing my
sceptical colleague and back home I starled studymg
literalure and case studies in order to be better prepared in
discussions with more technical orienled colleagues. The
question is whether ihe presenl lilerature provides évidence
for Ihe argumenl lhal law is important. With me y ou will
see that, contrary to the rather provocative statement cited
above, the answer is not categorically positive or negative,
but much more variegated.
Shortly thereafter
I found a supporter in Ihe person of Michael Cernea,
a consultant of the World Bank. Talking more specifically
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about national legal Systems, he staled: "Such macro-
societal lools as Ihe slale, ils policies, the cenlrally
instituted legal system, and fiscal levers are to guaranlee,
reinforce, and stiffen the backbone of even the lowest local
resource management system" (Cernea, 1994: 189). But
what is thé actual impacl of législation on thé management
of trees and foresls?
Over the last several years, case study lileralure has
developed examining Ihe différent légal and institutional
stratégies to improve thé management of natural resources
in developing countries. In thé lileralure available to me,
général environmental case studies on Africa are obviously
an overwhelming majority. This is withoul doubl due lo my
own geographical interest, but there may be another more
objective explanalion, as expressed by Plalteau (1991:3):
"Till the beginning of the seventies the attention of land
reforms was almost exclusively focussed on Latin America
and Asia, while Africa was commonly considered as 'a
special case' thanks to her abundant land endowmenls and
lo Ihe flexibilily of her indigenous land tenure institutions."
Another striking feature in the case study literature is the
attention given lo problems of forestry management m
developing countries. Generally speaking this attention may
be explained by the high value atlributed to trees and
forests with regard to a sound environment, whereas the
market value of wood is also high. In Africa the expansion
in agriculture and an increase in demand for fuelwood and
charcoal contribule to Ihe focus on foreslry.
Tenure securily lo land and securily of Iree lenure are
closely relaled. In agroforeslry, clear lenure rules, assuring
Ihe farmer Ihat plantod Irees on Ihe holding keeps
possession over the trees, are important. Bruce and
Fortmann (1989: 4) provide a good overview of Ihe
problems relaled lo properly and foreslry: "People who
have been exposed only to the more familiär forms of
Western property law often assume Ihat Irees are pari and
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parcel of the land on which they grow (...) but many tenure
Systems conter property rights in standing trees quite
different from the land on which they stand and may confer
those rights on someone other than the landholder" (See
also Fortmann and Riddle, 1988; Fortmann and Bruce,
1988).
State législation and policies may often have a serious
impact on the security of tree tenure for the individual man
or woman or local communities depending partly on trees
and tbrests for their living. "Often the state advances the
claim that it owns all uncultivated land, frequently in
concert with the principle that individuals can establish their
claims to land by clearing it" (Bruce and Fortmann,
1989:4).
The transfer of property rights from traditional user
groups to others éliminâtes the incentives for monitoring
and restrained use (McKean and Ostrom, 1995:4.). Famous
examples of such policies leading to deforestation are given
by Binswanger (1987) for the Brazilian Amazon, and
Rassam (1990) for Ivory Coast. In many former French
colonies in Africa forest management policy is based
principally on régulation of use through enforcement of
restrictions, within the forest reserves but also with regard
to trees on individual farms. Together with many
misinterpretations by the mighty but at the same time
poorly equipped forest service, the result is the absence of
security for individuals and groups on trees and tbrests3.
l wo u l d like to iliustrate
this with an example from Senegal, the country in
Africa I know best (Ribot, 1990, 1993 and 1995).
Since the long dry periods in the seventies and eighties, the
Senegalese government has been well aw,are of the process
of deforestation. It was realized that the charcoal
production was an important, and moreover a very visible
cause of deforestation. Therefore laws, régulations and
additional measures were adopted to keep the charcoal
production under control. The most important measures
3 For example on Land, Trees and Tenure from Africa, Asia and Latin
America, see Raintree, 1987. See also Kessler & Wiersum, 1995, with
regard to the Sahel.
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were the introduction of a national production quota,
divided among officially recognized production zones; the
limitation of the production period to the dry season and a
whole set of licences (labour licences, licences to transport
and to stock, etc.). When thé necessary licenses to produce
are obtained, thé agents of the Forestry Service allot certain
forest areas to thé entrepreneurs or coopératives. The
criteria used for allotting a plot are proneness of the soil to
érosion and thé présence of sufficient dead trees. When a
plot has been exploited a régénération period of 20 years
must be observed before it may be allotted again for thé
production of charcoal.
When judged on its own merits, thèse régulations seem
quite cohérent and appear reasonable. In reality, however,
thé ends, namely thé réduction of deforestation and thé
prévention of over-exploitation of forests, are not realized
at all. What has been achieved are financial revenues for
the state and thé Forestry Service and thé création of a
small group of rieh employers who hâve a quasi-monopoly
in thé charcoal sector. In fact, thé production season is not
observed and thé production quotas are not respected. Even
worse: thé deforestation is aggravated instead of stopped.
What are
thé reasons of failure of such a nice and cohérent set
of measures and rules? Firstly, there is a manifest
contradiction between the duty of the Forest Service to
protect thé forests and their obligation to provide urban
households with charcoal. The last task brings financial
revenues to thé Forest Service which is in constant lack of
means, while thé protection of the forests only costs
money.
Secondly, thé adopted rules do not take into account that
thé villagers in thé charcoal production zones need to use
products from thé forest on a daily basis to earn their
living. The criteria for thé sélection of forest areas are
physical in nature and no social criterion is involved. The
resuit is that the plots chosen for charcoal production are
nearly always in thé vicinity of a village. This is profitable
for employers, for they can lodge their labourers there, and
it brings short term profits to thé villagers who receive
some money for housing and food. The labourers,
however, do not only feil dead trees, they also eut trees
with only some dead branches, or they treat the bark of
living trees in such a way that they soon die. After some
time the végétation around the village is largely decimated,
so the villagers have to look for wood, leaves, roots and
fruits at a greater distance from the village. Their sheep,
goats and cattle roam around freely, eating up any natural
régénération. Thus villages that ever received a large group
of charcoal labourers will always be surrounded by plains
with scant végétation. By disregarding the needs of the
local Community, the Forestry Service neglects a real
partner in sustainable exploitation.
Thirdly, clientelism (favouritism, nepotism, ed.) is the
backbone of political culture in Senegal, permeating all
sectors of political and economie life. Such a system of
pervasive clientelism may imply several obstacles to
whatever environmental laws, régulations or policy are
employed. Let me just name some of those obstacles (Van
den Bremmer and Hesseling, forthcoming).
As soon as nature and natural resources represent a certain
financial value on the international or domestic market,
they also belong to those state resources which may serve
to establish favoured relationships. The quotas of charcoal
production is an example. The patrons see to it that their
clients acquire additional quotas, that forestry agents do not
apply any sanctions for infringement and that the
transgressors are immediately liberated from prison and
may go free. Clientelism disrupts the organization of less
powerful groups in order to prevent their empowerment and
their potential development to an opposition group. Finally,
clientelism displaces any notion of common good or the
genera! interest, and stimulâtes the unbridled search for
private advantage. Thus, it créâtes a moral context for the
tragedy of commons.
All these problems relate to government policies and
national lawmaking in a system based on favouritism.
Therefore, nowadays solutions are sought in a
àecentralized, participatory management of nature and
natural resources. In Africa, governments are
experimenting a whole range of more participatory ways to
come to more sustainable Systems of resources management
at a local level. Let me just try to explore one of them: the
development of local conventions with regard to the
management of village forests.
Indeed,
in the current discussion about improved
management of land and natural resources, local
management contracts are increasingly considered as a
valuable option. To date, few experiments with local
management contracts have been fully documented;
consequently there is little évidence to evaluate the
long-term rôle, impact or sustainability of those contracts.
In Mali, contracting local management conventions forms
an integral part of the decentralization policy with regard to
natural resources. As in the beginning of the 90s, the Land
Law and the Forestry Code were in a process of reform,
the drawing up of local rules for forest management was
allowed by the authorities by way of exception. To my
knowledge, just one experiment with this kind of
conventions has been documented (Hilhorst and Coulibaly,
1995, 1996).
It concerns a convention involving six villages in the
management of the "brousse" (common property resources
-forest and pasture- in the "bush"). The negotiations to
arrive at a draft convention took years, mainly because of
the following factors:
difficulties in convincing the villagers to limit their
activities with regard to their resources;
some villages had to give up part of their resources
in favour of less gifted villages;
the élaboration of a system of control and sanctions,
the low priées of wood as a disincentive for
investments in the maintenance of the forests and
pastures, and
the résistance of local forest agents and civil
servants to really transfer part of their powers to the
villages.
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The draft convention still needs the support of a
professional lawyer in order to be designed in proper
juridical terms. And the sometimes vehement discussions
with the official parties in order to overcome their
résistance seriously slow down the process of
operationalization. But the process of negotiation in itself
(involving not only the six villages, but also civil servants
and external donors) constitutes a promising resuit of the
contractual approach.
In China also, the government experiments with local
contracts to improve thé management of forests. According
to Bruce et al (1995), thé "lack of law" in China's légal
culture does not prevent but rather facilitâtes such
expérimentations. "Contracts hâve played a major rôle in
filling gaps in both the law of property and the law of
associations, with charters and agreements used to define
institutions, and leases used to customize tenure
arrangements." (p. 48).
Contractual arrangements with regard to local forests are
not always considered as a valuable option. However, in
certain situations, especially in situations of rapid changes
and transition, thé contractual approach may hâve
advantages and provide positive légal and institutional
incentives for local management. Indeed, the contractual
approach offers flexibility in:
• thé number of parties involved. For example, it
could make it casier to involve thé appropriate
groups, e.g. seasonal users of a forest, plus local
NGOs and private producers groups;
• protecting "bundles of rights" of various users
groups. While property rights (which in thé long
term make land registration) establish thé rights of
one person or one group, a contract can handle
situations involving "bundles of rights" and a
variety of user groups;
• duration of the contract. In situations of rapid
developments, a contract can yet guarantee users thé
benefits of their investments, as long as they fulfïl
their obligations;
• tailoring contract stipulations to spécifie local
situations.
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Additional advantages are: *// ;
• certain stipulations could be used to lay down the*-••£
rights and obligations of all parues; '.^
• a contract can be better adapted to local conditioas"rt>
inparticular, it can contain a clause creating thé. •"$
possibility of, under spécifie conditions, breakirjfe ' '''*\
open the contract and reopening negotiations; **"$
• agreement of local contracts with regional and ;r'^J
national policy can be assured by standard '*'/%\
incorporation of the obligation that these must ftttf "*
within the local policy plans, since this must be
accord with the framework of regional and
policy plans (Hesseling, 1994 and Picciotto,
In conclusion, contracts may contribute to creating a = '*-^A
socially broad basis for new policies, because parties IsM^d!
more influence on, and are with respect to content aïsoX f,.\
more interested in the outcome as in the case of govemrijÄ-
regulations. That does not alter the fact that important 'f11' 'S
juridical and institutional conditions are yet to be fuMl^lÉ
present day Africa to really make the contractual appr<a|i|ri
a workable option for local environmental management^!™
To conclude, ':*$*A
let me now try to draw some lessons from the-1.}$$
practice. The example from Senegal demonstrated
spite of a set of legal rules which on the face of it ap]
to be appropriate to push back the process of deforesi
the intended goals were not achieved. It would be
to jump to the conclusion that law is not important
management of forests. Indeed, I will show that the*
prospects of changing the behaviour of people (vii
forestry agents and other government officials)
national législation tend to be grossly overestimated,
do that with the help of a figure, worked out by the
sociology of law professor John Griffiths. -J
The figure shows that the behaviour of peasaffc
and women, government officials and foresters, and,s
and international development workers is governed fjét
by national legal rules, but also by rules generaled Ig? j
kinds of social networks of individuals, and the
interdependent articulation of many of them. Wii
iy^ processes, the American anthropologist Sally Falk
(1978: 57-58) developed the concept of the
4-autonomous social field. I will not bother you now
ie complex définition of this concept.
Figure 1: Analytic diagram of the social working of law.
"What will the (wo)man on the shop floor actually do?".






Figure l, which summarizes the theory of the "social
working of law", may serve as a kind of help desk to better
understand why a particular législation intended to improve
the management of local forests not always has the expected
results and sometimes even produces undesired and
undesirable side-effects. It focuses on the shop floor of
social life, the place where the
activities which the legislator would
regulate are taking place. The
central question then, is not the
intention of the lawmaker, but what
the man or woman on the shop
floor actually will do. The answer
to this question is not an easy one.
Several factors have to be taken m
account (Griffiths, 1992).
First, the attitudes of farmers,
cattle breeders or woodcutters with
respect to land, pastures or forests
are also determined by social
relationships: gender, power
relations, status and so on. Second,
before the legal message mcluded
m the law reaches the (wo)man m
the field, it is subjected to vanous
transformations by interprétation or
mismterpretation. And third,
management and exploitation of
forests are not subject to just one
single, coherent body of legal
concepts and rules, but to plural
normative Systems (state law,
indigenous law, religieus law and
sometimes also project law):
societies are charactenzed by legal
pluralism (Von Benda Beckmann,
1991: 78). To make it even more
complex, Von Benda Beckmann
continues: "Over time, both state
laws and traditional laws have
changed considerably, and hybrid
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of éléments of various Systems, have developed in many
Third World régions."
In other words, the theory of the social working of law
warns us that lawmaking as such cannot always play the
rôle of "catalyst" for the desired change of environmental
behaviour in local communities. The introduction of new
législation therefore requires thorough knowledge of the
situation at local level. In this respect, the maxim put
forward by Oakerson (1988: 151) seems appropriate:
"Don't destroy the base. Décide what part of the existing
structure of society constitutes a useful base, and seek to
preserve and build upon it".
The development of local conventions for the management
of forests may be an interesting approach, but only under
the condition that they are embedded within the national
législation. As Cernea (1994:189) puts it: "The local level
dérives strength not just from its 'localness' and self
Containment, but from the extent to which the supra-local
levels stand behind it, and legitimize and empower it."
Thus, national législation remains a key instrument for
developing a new policy on thé management of trees and
forests.
l now return to
my initial question: "Is law important for thé local
level management for trees and forest ? "
My interest in this question started after a rather trivial but
familiär dispute between technical experts and social
experts. The empirical studies focussing on the different
legal stratégies adopted to improve the management of
forests at the local level have indeed revealed that rule
making (state laws or customary laws, at a national or at a
decentralised level) will not automatically generale
incentives for certain kinds of activities or discourage
actors from other kinds of behaviour. Let me give three
reasons.
Firstly, modern law Systems are often too centralistic
denying the relatively efficiënt, dynamic and legitimate
nature of local management practices. They therefore
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provide few safeguards for local people which underm
their incentive for a better management of trees and fo
Thus, a prerequisite for legal measures in local forest
management is that they are flexible and adapted to fit
various local practices.
Secondly, an analysis in terms of législation has to be
situated in a perspective of the social working of law,
including the stratégies developed by the (wo)men at tl
shop floor in response to the imposed rules on the basi
their culture (norms, rules, social relations etc.), the
spécifie characteristics of the resource involved, the se
and political context and so on. The degree of success
external norms varies greatly, depending on the contej
which they must work. Thus, instead of laws prescribi
such or such behaviour, it will be désirable to formula
laws allowing the quest for and application of a whole
spectrum of possible solutions.
Thirdly, local organizations have to be nested within a
of larger organizations and authorities, including the s
for dealing with problems beyond the boundaries of th
community.
The conclusion of this intellectual exercise may be
somewhat disappointing: the point of departure as wel
the conclusion being général.
Indeed, my reaction to my colleague's statemer
would now be that laws and institutions appear to be a
same time incentives and disincentives for local
environmental management and therefore intervention;
the sphère of lawmaking at all levels will remain
indispensable. The potential to create légal and institut
incentives for local management of trees and forests is
undoubtedly present in national législation, in decentn
management structures and in local contracts and
agreements. There is no need to make a choice betwe«
these three approaches which may coexist within the s
legal System. Methods and stratégies of the approache
have to be continually improved and adapted to new
challenges by taking into account social, technical and
political factors. And finally, legal and institutional
instruments alone will never generale enough incentivi
change the environmental behaviour of local communi
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